


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## STAFF NOTES:

### Soviet Union Eastern Europe

State Department review completed

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


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**SOVIET UNION - EASTERN EUROPE**

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USSR-Somalia

During a conversation with a senior US official in Mogadiscio on July 7, Soviet Ambassador Samsonov admitted that there is a missile-handling facility at Berbera. He said it was for short-range missiles for the Somali navy. This is the first time a Soviet official has acknowledged that such a facility exists at Berbera.

Samsonov did not use the NATO term Styx, although it had been used in a Moscow news commentary referring to Secretary Schlesinger's testimony before the House Armed Services Committee.

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Samsonov met with President Siad following Senator Bartlett's tour of Berbera on July 4. He may have persuaded Siad that Bartlett's group had been allowed too easy access to installations in the area because Congressman Stratton's tour two days later was more restricted.

Samsonov's admission may be the harbinger of a shift in Moscow's public line from denials of Soviet bases to assertions that all military facilities are there to serve the Somalis. It also seems to indicate that the Somalis will, indeed, get patrol boats to put under the Styx.

The question now is whether and how all the publicity will affect future Soviet use of the facilities. Soviet investment at Berbera is sizable, and the Soviets will curtail their operations there reluctantly, if at all. Their inclination probably will be to stay with the hope that the worst of the embarrassment is behind them.

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Much will depend on the Somalis. The odds are that Siad has too much at stake in his relationship with Moscow to turn back now.



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Soviet Jewish Emigration Continues Decline

During the first six months of this year, 6,253 people ostensibly bound for Israel received permission to emigrate from the USSR [redacted]

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[redacted] This figure is more than 40 percent below the comparable 1974 figure and nearly 60 percent below the record high reached in the first half of 1973. More than half of those declaring for Israel have gone elsewhere--most to the US.

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[redacted] the decline in emigration this year is probably attributable to the increasing success of Soviet authorities in dissuading potential emigrants from filing exit applications. The Soviets offer inducements not to file, such as promises of advancement in employment and educational opportunities, coupled with negative pressures, such as reproaches from colleagues and neighbors who have been made aware that a family is considering emigration. While the emigrants do not report notable increases in outright harassment by Soviet authorities, "exemplary" instances of imprisonment and loss of employment have effectively intimidated many would-be applicants.

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Disinformation on living standards in the West, as well as grapevine accounts of genuine difficulties in adjusting to life in Israel and the US, has also been instrumental in lowering the emigration rate. Even some of the better educated applicants appear genuinely to believe that unemployment and other economic woes have driven Western living standards lower than those in the Soviet Union. [redacted]

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[redacted] the only identifiable group still firmly committed to settling in Israel are the "Oriental" Jews from the Caucasus and Central Asian regions.

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Party chief Brezhnev strongly implied in a recent meeting with a group of American Senators that the tighter Soviet policy on Jewish emigration will continue. His remarks were obviously intended to make clear that no Soviet concessions could be expected before the American Congress removes the link between freer emigration and expanded trade.

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Soviet Law Adopted on Use of Raw Materials

Heightened Soviet concern over industrial use of nonrenewable raw materials is reflected by the adoption July 9 of legislation on the subject by the Supreme Soviet.

The law, as presented by Deputy Premier Tikhonov, is designed to achieve:

- Higher recovery rates at existing mines and wells.
- Greater use of mineral by-products in processing.
- More intensive and accurate geological exploration.

Tikhonov took to task the geology and nonferrous metallurgy ministries for ineptness in uncovering new resources and in recovering by-products during processing. He touched lightly on environmental requirements, particularly the "re-cultivation" of lands scarred by mining.

Officials have long expressed concern over the wasteful handling of raw materials. The legislation seems particularly appropriate at a time when the next five and fifteen year plans are being formulated and exploitation of mineral resources in the eastern regions is being pushed forward. Achievement of the law's objectives, however, will require a considerable capital investment and modification of production practices that now stress maximizing immediate output.

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Czechoslovakia: More on Salgovic

The political star of Viliam Salgovic, who two weeks ago was appointed to the Slovak party Presidium (Politburo) to fill the vacancy left by the death of Ondrej Klokoč, has evidently risen further. On July 7 he was elected the chairman of the Slovak National Council--another of Klokoč's jobs

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In the process, Salgovic was released as head of the Slovak party control and auditing commission, but the promotion of this notoriously hard-line Slovak to fill posts formerly held by a moderate must unsettle many Slovaks and Czechs. Indeed, the three-month delay in picking a successor to Klokoč suggests that the choice of Salgovic was preceded by some hard political infighting.

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Some [redacted] argue that Salgovic was "kicked upstairs" when he gave up his party control post for the largely ceremonial job on the Slovak National Council. This theory, however, fails to take into account the significance of Salgovic's promotion to the Slovak party Presidium. His membership on this top policy-making body visibly strengthens the conservative element in the Slovak party leadership.

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